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**T**hough it has the fourth-largest population in the world, the huge archipelago of Indonesia remains almost unknown to most that live outside the region. In other words, “to most people, Indonesia is a cipher, by far the least-known of the world’s great nations.”<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, though it is home for about 200 million Muslims, the fascinating Islamic mosaic of Indonesia still seems to be regarded by many as peripheral to the Islamic world.

(In the wake of September 11 and the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002, Islam in Indonesia has ostensibly gained more attention in the West. But this attention has mostly led to an increase in new observers. Many of them view Indonesia primarily through the prism of the “war on terror.” Such attention naturally focuses on current affairs and tends to ignore Indonesia’s cultural, social and political complexity. It consequently misses insights that a more panoramic view of the country might provide, including insights to be found in the intriguing case study of Islam and polity in Indonesia.

While the world media focuses its attention on manifestations of religious extremism and violence in Indonesia, and on the traces of global jihad there, it tends to ignore, to some extent, the recent and high-

ly significant changes in its political institutions. Over the past few years, a democratic transformation is making this country—home to the largest Muslim community on the planet—into the third largest democracy in the world. Indonesia’s transition to democracy has faced many obstacles, but its foundations have been laid down in an impressive way.

One should not ignore, of course, the increasing manifestation of religious intolerance and extremism in the post-Suharto era—the louder voices of hard-line Muslims and radical Islamic fundamentalists, as well as the violence and terror carried out by militants. These manifestations challenge the nation’s traditions of religious pluralism and tolerance that are grounded in the cultural values of such a highly diverse society and shared by the majority of its

Muslims. Such manifestations also challenge the existing political system in Indonesia, which is based on the nation's "secular," or religiously neutral, ideology called "Pancasila." This state ideology treats equally all the recognized religions in the country—Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism—by keeping as its first principle the "Belief in One God."

## The Challenge of Radical Islam

Radical Islamic fundamentalism is present in the vast Indonesian archipelago, and radical militancy has already shown its destructive power there. The Bali bombing, which killed 202 people and injured hundreds more, shocked many into recognizing the octopus-like spread of terrorists who claim to act under the banner of Islam. This growing danger was confirmed by other lesser—but nonetheless significant—terrorist attacks in Indonesia, such as lethal blasts at Jakarta's Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003, near the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004 and in Bali on 1 October 2005. The case of the large Muslim militia Laskar Jihad also seems to be burned into the collective Indonesian memory. Laskar Jihad, which announced its disbanding soon after the first Bali bombings, caught the country's attention in the years 2000-2002 when, in the name of jihad, it was deeply involved in the bloody communal conflict between Muslims and Christians in the province of Maluku.<sup>2</sup> Calls for jihad by it and other Islamic militant organizations are also closely connected with the Poso area that was a scene for bitter communal conflict in the years 1999-2001.<sup>3</sup>

In Indonesia, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, those who have a radical fundamentalist outlook are deeply involved in the propagation of Islam through religious proselytizing known in the Malay-Indonesian world as *dakwah* (*dawa* in Arabic). This concept focuses mainly on strengthening the faith of

Muslims who are perceived as being lax in their religious practices. Radicals are not the only Muslims who engage in *dawa* activity, but they are the most zealous. They hold *dawa* to be an important duty to accomplish the transformation of Muslim society at large—which they see as unjust and ignorant of the true way of Islam—into a genuine Islamic society and polity.

A complex mechanism for transmitting Islamic knowledge and ideas from the "center" of the Islamic world to Indonesia has been established over the centuries.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, the radical fundamentalist ideas in Indonesia today have come mostly from the "center" of the Islamic world, the Middle East in particular, through cross-regional and global networks. The Wahhabi ideas that have some appeal in Indonesia certainly came from the Middle East. Wahhabi doctrine originated on the Arabian Peninsula and is closely associated with *salafi* concepts; both call for a return to the pure way of *al-salaf al-salih* (the venerable forefathers). Followers of the Wahhabi puritan interpretation of Islam in Indonesia prefer to describe it as *salafi* Islam.<sup>5</sup>

Ideas from this stream of Islamic thought have been disseminated throughout the archipelago through various channels. Ja'far Umar Thalib, who became prominent as the leader of Laskar Jihad in the years 2000-2002, for example, was initially exposed to Salafi-Wahhabi teachings during three years of study (1983-86) at the Saudi-financed Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA) in Jakarta. He continued his Islamic studies at the Maududi Islamic Institute in Lahore. From 1987 to 1989, he was further exposed to Salafi-Wahhabi teachings on the battlefield of Afghanistan, where he first joined one *mujahidin* faction affiliated with Saudi Arabia and subsequently supported another faction tied to a strict, Saudi-based *salafi* organization. In 1989 Thalib returned to Indonesia and taught in a *salafi* school. In 1991 he traveled to Yemen to widen his Salafi-Wahhabi knowledge. He also attended religious lectures given by prominent Saudi Salafi-Wahhabi teachers when he went to the neighboring Saudi Arabia for the *hajj*.<sup>6</sup>

In 1993 Thalib returned to Indonesia, and in

1994 he established a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) near Yogyakarta known as Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah (Association for Revitalizing the Sunna). This community focused on strict Islamic pietism and puritanism, calling for a return to the model of *al-salaf al-salih* and hoping to build an Islamic society. Guided by the *salafi* concepts of personal salvation through faith and the purification of religion by following the model *al-salaf al-salih*, Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah avoided the political aspects of Islam. Typical of Salafis, Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah was very involved with *dawa*, which it directed primarily toward the Muslim students' discussion groups (*kelompok pengajian*) or study groups (*halaqah*) that had arisen on many "secular" campuses in Indonesia since the 1980s.

Early in 1998, however, on the eve of Suharto's downfall and while the political crisis was intensifying, this Salafi-Wahhabi movement started to reorient itself from non-political *dawa* to political activism.<sup>7</sup> This change came when Thalib established the radical Islamic organization Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama'ah (FKAWJ, Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna). The members of Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah became the backbone of the new organization.<sup>8</sup> This shift in orientation became even more evident with the establishment of Laskar Jihad in 2000.

Ideological texts have also played a significant role in fomenting radical fundamentalist attitudes among Indonesians. Not many Indonesian Muslims are able to read Arabic fluently, but they have access to seminal fundamentalist texts through translations into Indonesian. Significant among these works are the writings of Hassan al-Banna (1904-49), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and one of the foremost ideological fathers of Islamic fundamentalism. Another prominent author whose writings have been translated into Malay-Indonesian in recent decades is the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), the radical thinker of the Muslim Brothers. He has left a clear imprint on radical Muslims in Indonesia, as well as on radicals in other parts of the Sunni world. The writings of Abul-A'la al-Maududi (1903-79), the founder of the Indo-Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami

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party are also known in Indonesia through translations. Even though Indonesia's vast Muslim community is predominantly Sunni, radical Shi'a revolutionary thought and writings have made their way there as well. While Ayatollah Khomeini seems to have little appeal in Southeast Asia, the writings of 'Ali Shari'ati (1933–77), a formative intellectual of the Iranian revolution, has won considerable popularity in Indonesia.<sup>9</sup>

As elsewhere in the Islamic world, radical fundamentalists in Indonesia have proved to be quick and skillful in using modern communications technology to propagate their message. The internet has clearly facilitated the transfer of information and ideas of radical fundamentalist organizations from the "center" of the Islamic world to Indonesia. Certain private *pesantren*, run by clerics who preach radical Islamic doctrine, are also helping to advance these ideas in Indonesia.<sup>10</sup>

Playing a salient role in the current story of radical Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia have been certain Indonesians of Arab descent, particularly Hadrami or Yemeni descent. Since the fifteenth century, the Hadramis, who were deeply involved in trade between the Middle East and Southeast Asia, have been instrumental in proselytizing the Malay-Indonesian world. Among Indonesian Muslims, they have enjoyed a prestigious reputation for piety and adherence to an orthodox way of life. Today people of Hadrami descent are conspicuous among the leaders of radical Muslims groups in Indonesia. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), has a Hadrami background, as did the late Abdullah Sungkar, co-founder with Ba'asyir of the Ngruki Network in the late 1970s. This network is considered to be the historical antecedent of Jamaah Islamiyah.<sup>11</sup> Ja'far Umar Thalib, who headed Laskar Jihad until its disbandment, is also of Hadrami descent.<sup>12</sup>

Islam's militant aspect with its war cry of jihad—inspired in large measure by ideas from the Middle East—dates far back into the history of Indonesia. The zealous and powerful Wahhabi-oriented Padri movement was active in West Sumatra in the first decades of the nineteenth century.<sup>13</sup> Also in the nine-

teenth century a series of peasant revolts in Java—though viewed primarily as social and political movements—were marked by Islamic religious revivalism, millenarianism, extremism, and militancy. They were further characterized by pan-Islamism and anti-Western sentiment. In these peasant revolts anti-Western feeling was expressed as hatred toward the Dutch, who were labeled "enemies" of Islam. A vivid awareness among Indonesian Muslims that their country was regarded as *dar al-Islam* ("the abode of Islam"), temporarily administrated by foreign rulers, led to calls for waging *jihad* against the *kafir* (infidel) rulers.<sup>14</sup> This call for jihad also affected the Acehese war against the Dutch, which officially began in 1873. In 1881 the local *ulema* declared the war a *jihad* or *perang sabil* (from *perang fi sabilillah*, which means "war in the cause/path of God"). This breathed new life into the Acehese resistance, which subsequently became a religiously inspired guerilla war led by the village *ulema*.<sup>15</sup>

Over a hundred years after the Padri movement, another outbreak of Islamic militancy occurred, this time in West Java. In 1948 the Darul Islam (DI) movement, led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (1905-62), started a *jihad* against Dutch colonialism and set up the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army). The movement called its own territory *dar al-Islam* and the territory held by the Dutch *dar al-Harb* (the abode of war). From the end of 1948 onward, Darul Islam made the Indonesian Republic rather than the Dutch its major target, arguing that Indonesia's secular leaders were as evil as the Dutch because they had rejected Islam as the new nation's sole foundation. In August 1949 Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the establishment of the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia). He himself, as the head of the state, was given the title of Imam. The war cry of Darul Islam spread from West Java to parts of Central Java, to South Sulawesi (Celebes), South Kalimantan (Borneo), and Aceh to include rebellious movements in these areas. All of these rebellions were carried out under the banner of Islam, though they had other important, non-religious aspects. Known collectively as the Darul Islam rebellions, these insurgencies greatly

concerned the central government in Jakarta during the 1950s. It was not until the early 1960s that the Indonesian army finally succeeded in suppressing them and in capturing Kartosuwirjo in 1962. He was executed in that same year.<sup>16</sup>

However, Kartosuwirjo's influence has not disappeared. He is seen as having inspired the militant Ngruki Network, which emerged in Central Java in the 1970s and became a significant hotbed of Islamic radicalism. The commitment of this militant group and its offspring, Jamaah Islamiyah, to fight for an Islamic state in Indonesia owes a great deal to the model provided by Kartosuwirjo and his Darul Islam movement. Veteran members of Darul Islam joined the ranks of Jamaah Islamiyah. It is argued, furthermore, that the underground support network of Darul Islam in West Java was never entirely destroyed and continues to play a considerable role in Islamic radicalism in Indonesia today.<sup>17</sup> Referring to the September 2004 bombing in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, a report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) states that "no understanding of jihadism in Indonesia is possible without understanding the Darul Islam movement (DI) and its efforts to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia." The report goes on to note that "every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life."<sup>18</sup>

## The Marginality of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia—A Paradox?

The growing visibility of radical Islamic fundamentalism in post-Suharto Indonesia has caused alarm in the West and led to some speculation in the Western media that Indonesia was becoming a "terrorist base," a "hotbed of terrorism,"

a "haven for al-Qaeda," a "breeding ground for terrorism," and so on. Such speculation, which has recently decreased, exaggerated the danger. Though Islamic radicals seem to have increased in number and assertiveness since Indonesia started its transition to democracy in 1998, they have failed to capture the imagination of the majority of the country's Muslims: their message is simply not attractive to the dominant Muslim mainstream. The radicals are considered to represent only a tiny proportion of the country's 200 million Muslims, and they seem to be far from realizing their declared goal of making Indonesia into an "Islamic state."

Even those Islamic political parties holding "soft" fundamentalist positions—favoring the imposition of Islamic law (*sharia*) and turning Indonesia into an Islamic state while remaining committed to the democratic process—have been in the minority in two successive democratic elections: the 1999 parliamentary election (which followed the fall of Suharto in May 1998 and was the first free democratic election since 1955), and the 2004 parliamentary election. In 2004 these parties, which reject the state ideology of Pancasila accepted by both the secular-oriented parties and the "pluralistic Islamic parties,"<sup>19</sup> did indeed increase their strength from 16 to about 21 percent of the vote. But this success is ascribed primarily to the moderation of their rhetoric during the campaign. Aware of Indonesian society's reservations about political Islam, they consciously downplayed their Islamic profile before the election. Their candidates chose to campaign on issues that many Indonesians care about, such as corruption, social injustice, and food prices, rather than to discuss the possibility of establishing Indonesia as an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia*.

At first glance, it is actually surprising that radical Islamic fundamentalism has not taken hold among more Muslims in Indonesia. The country is certainly beset by many of the conditions that foster such radicalism elsewhere: cultural bewilderment in a changing world, feelings of distress in alienating urban centers, economic hardship, annoyance with the luxurious life of the elites, widespread corruption,

sectarian tensions, and the difficulties posed by democratic transition. In many Muslim countries with similar problems, radical Islamic fundamentalism has emerged and flourished, particularly among young people who seek their own salvation in the fundamentalist groups. But while Indonesia's Islamic radicals have caught the eye of many observers in recent years, it is the moderate, tolerant type of religious belief that dominates the Muslim mainstream there. Importantly, this mainstream has played a highly significant role in building a civil society and democratic polity in Indonesia and in sounding a distinctive voice against radicalism.

## Bulwarks against Islamic Radicalism

Reasons for the relative marginality of radical Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia can be found in the nature of Indonesian society in general and its Islamic society in particular. For centuries intellectual and organizational pluralism has been a distinctive feature of Indonesian Islam. Even in pre-modern times neither the courts nor the *ulema* monopolized authority over the moral and intellectual life of the Muslim community in the Malay-Indonesian world. There were diverse ideas and religious views about the way to be a good Muslim. The people of the Indonesian archipelago, notes scholar Robert W. Hefner, have long grappled with what social theorists today often regard as a uniquely modern issue, that is, cultural pluralism.<sup>20</sup> The ideals of religious pluralism and tolerance are deeply grounded in the archipelago's cultural values and are closely connected with the story of Islam's introduction into Indonesia.

It should be noted that the process of Islamization in the region has been carried out, to a large extent, in a peaceful way.<sup>21</sup> Maritime trade was an essential element in bringing Islam to South-East Asia. The marriage of foreign Muslims to native women and the conversion of court circles also advanced the

Islamization of the region, as did influential Sufi Islamic teachers. The history of the expansion of Islam to Indonesia is, in fact, intimately connected with Sufism, which has long supported religious tolerance and pluralism and has always exerted a significant influence on Islam in Indonesia. "The spread of Islam in Southeast Asia was hesitant, modest and discreet," says A. H. Johns; "what was achieved in one century in the Middle East took virtually a millennium in Southeast Asia."<sup>22</sup>

The ideals of religious tolerance and pluralism have been integrated into the state ideology of Pancasila. In the period preceding independence, particularly during the formative discussions about state ideology and institutions, Muslim activists who supported political Islam argued for the establishment of an Islamic state that would enforce *sharia*. In their debate with the leading nationalist group, however, the nationalists won.<sup>23</sup> Indonesia adopted an ideology dedicated to "unity in diversity" and religious pluralism. Pancasila respects all five major religions—Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism—without giving preferential treatment to any one of them. The Indonesian regime, particularly during Suharto's New Order era, then worked hard to establish Pancasila as the dominant ideology and a vehicle for unity, progress, and modernization. Between 1983 and 1985 the large Muslim mass organizations were required to recognize Pancasila as their "sole foundation" (*asas tunggal*). Given the multi-faith and multicultural nature of the archipelago, respect for pluralism was considered to be an imperative precondition for stability.

Suharto eventually succeeded in imposing Pancasila, and calls for an Islamic state and the imposition of *sharia* were significantly reduced during his regime. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, was the first Muslim mass organization to accept Pancasila as its ideological foundation. But despite repressive measures by the authoritarian regime, yearning for an Islamic state did persist throughout the Suharto era.<sup>24</sup> There was, therefore, some ground for speculation that the fall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto in May 1998 would lead to renewed efforts to establish an

Islamic state, particularly because the voice of Islam grew stronger in the last years of Suharto's reign.

However, such speculation has proved to be wrong. Political parties that freely express Islamic political goals, including the ideas of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state and of implementing Islamic law, have indeed emerged. Nevertheless, the parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2004 have shown that Pancasila is favored by the majority. This was also illustrated by the August 2002 decision of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People's Consultative Assembly), the super-parliament constitutional body, to reject a constitutional amendment proposed by Islamic parties to implement *sharia* for Indonesian Muslims. This decision was strongly backed by the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia—the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, which claims 35-40 million members, and the modernist Islamic Muhammadiyah, which claims about 30 million.

These two huge Muslim organizations, which have dominated Islam in Indonesia for most of the twentieth century, provide another bulwark against radical fundamentalist ideas. Both organizations accept Pancasila and the basic idea of pluralism, and are even described as “the first block’ to be passed by new Islamic movements promoting Islamic *sharia* as the solution.”<sup>25</sup> The traditionalist NU is considered to be the more tolerant and comfortable with the idea of a secular state, as well as with syncretic forms of Islam.<sup>26</sup> Muhammadiyah has become more conservative, and certain people within it support a greater role for Islam in the Indonesia polity. It is also possible to find among its millions of members—and even in the ranks of the NU—individuals with a fundamentalist frame of mind who reject Pancasila and wish to see *sharia* as the sole foundation of Indonesian law.<sup>27</sup>

Both the NU and Muhammadiyah have proved themselves to be essentially moderate, however. They provide a significant platform for the national ideals of tolerance and plurality, and are widely regarded as bulwarks against religious extremism in Indonesia. The two organizations were active in setting up NGOs that helped to build civil society during

Suharto's era, a process that greatly contributed to the political change in Indonesia in 1998. In addition to being pillars of civil society, these organizations provide services that promote general welfare. Both possess a wide educational infrastructure and engage in welfare activities that enable them to maintain and strengthen their hold on the Muslim population, as well as their prominent position in Indonesian civil society. Their schools and educational institutes are instrumental in delivering their messages. In sum, the NU and Muhammadiyah are significant guardians of Indonesian Islam's distinctive pluralistic and tolerant nature. The Oslo Coalition of Freedom of Religion or Belief reported:

The existence of such large and well-functioning Muslim networks as NU and Muhammadiyah, in which new lines of thought in the leadership may trickle down to millions of adherents, is a rather unique feature of Indonesian Islam which makes the role of religious organisations in civil reform and raising of human rights' awareness all the more important.<sup>28</sup>

Another intriguing factor in the Islamic space of Indonesia that clearly defies religious zeal and extremism is liberal Islamic thought. Indeed, intellectuals from other parts of the Islamic world preceded Indonesian intellectuals in formulating liberal Islamic concepts. But while such ideas have occupied only a small number of intellectuals in most of the world's Muslim communities, their proponents seem to have a larger presence in Indonesia. There Islamic liberalism has imprinted itself, not only on Islamic discourse, but also on the general national discourse.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the pioneers of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia came from a younger generation of intellectuals. They developed a new stream of thought widely known by the term “neo-modernism”—a term that indicates their indebtedness to Fazlur Rahman (1911-88), the Pakistani-American Islamic thinker who had taught several of these Indonesian intellectuals at the University of Chicago.<sup>29</sup> It was only later on that

their corpus of ideas was identified as an expression of liberal Islamic ideas.<sup>30</sup> This neo-modernist movement in Indonesia is strongly linked to its principal founders, including Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), Abdurrahman Wahid (born in 1940), Harun Nasution (1919-98), Munawir Syadzali (1925-2004), Djohan Effendi (born in 1939), and Ahmad Whahib (1942-73).

The current wave of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia is known primarily as “Islam Liberal.” It borrows much from neo-modernist discourse, thereby providing a sort of intellectual continuity between the older and younger generations of those who support liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. Various circles, organized to a large extent as NGOs, now foster liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia. Crucial among them is Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, Liberal Islam Network), which presents itself as a loose forum for discussing and disseminating the concept of Islamic liberalism in Indonesia and as “a community which is studying and bringing forth a discourse on Islamic vision that is tolerant, open and supportive for the strengthening of Indonesian democratization.”<sup>31</sup> According to JIL, one reason for its establishment in 2001 was “to counter the growing influence and activism of militant and radical Islam in Indonesia.”<sup>32</sup>

The neo-modernism that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s addressed the conceptual antagonism between two opposing Indonesian worldviews—that of the secular-oriented government and that of Muslim activists and thinkers who wished to see Indonesia become an Islamic state. Attempting to find ground for some sort of compromise, the neo-modernists argued for a new approach to *ijtihad*, the independent theological reasoning in legal questions. They suggested a contextualized approach for interpreting Islamic texts that is attentive to contemporary circumstances, the particularities of the Indonesian archipelago, and the demands of the modern age. This approach to *ijtihad* was offered as an alternative to the traditional *taqlid*, the alleged blind and uncritical acceptance of the theological interpretations of the four schools of canon law (*al-madhahib*).

The proponents of Islamic neo-modernism also argued that Islam does not have any particular conceptual or theoretical preferences concerning systems of government. They likewise argued that implementation of Islam should be done culturally and not on a political basis. Islamic movements, they argued, should be cultural rather than political, religion should remain in the realm of the transcendental, and Islamization in Indonesia should not contradict the process of Indonesianization. Nurcholish Madjid clearly declared, “Islam yes, Islamic party no.” Consequently, the adherents of neo-modernism have accepted Pancasila as the ideological basis of the Indonesian polity and objected to the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic state. They supported Pancasila as the best political formula for fostering harmonious relations among all the country’s faiths and for establishing a spiritual, ethical, and moral basis for national development.

The Islamic neo-modernists even granted Pancasila a religious-historical legitimacy. They argued that Pancasila ought to be regarded as similar to the Medina Charter, the contract signed by the Prophet Mohammed, the Jews, and the polytheists early in Islamic history. The Medina Charter provided basic political principles for the pluralistic society of Medina and offers, according to the neo-modernists, a relevant Islamic model for Indonesia by demonstrating genuine respect for religious freedom within an Islamic context. Neo-modernism has thus emerged as an Islamic movement that treads a middle way, rejecting both the orthodox, holistic concept of the state as an integral part of Islam, and the secular notion of a complete partition between Islam and the affairs of state.<sup>33</sup>

Despite its elitist roots, neo-modernism has had a broad impact on central issues and developments in Indonesia. Neo-modernists have acquired important positions in Indonesia’s intellectual life, influencing many young educated Muslims, and their opinions are respected in both Islamic discourse and the general public discourse. In the Suharto era they helped promote the Muslim mainstream’s genuine acceptance of Pancasila as the legitimate ideological basis of the state.<sup>34</sup> They also seem to advance

among Muslims, to some degree, the idea of separation between politics and religion, making the concept of “cultural Islam” an attractive alternative to the concept of political Islam. For example, Madjid’s above-mentioned slogan “Islam yes, Islamic party no” has had wide resonance. The elections of 1999 in which the majority voted for political parties that accept Pancasila—as was again the case in the elections of 2004—were celebrated within liberal Muslim circles as a victory of “cultural Islam” over political Islam.<sup>35</sup>

Neo-modernism has also been an agent of modernity and progressive ideas by emphasizing the use of *ijtihad* as a tool for making Islam receptive to the needs of the modern age. Indeed, Muslim reformists in Indonesia, inspired by the Islamic modernist Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), have called for using *ijtihad* since the first decades of the twentieth century. But the neo-modernists have arguably shown greater intellectual determination than their predecessors in endorsing the concept of *ijtihad* as a way to escape the grip of strict traditional percepts.<sup>36</sup> Neo-modernism has been instrumental as well in building Indonesia’s massive and influential civil society and in advancing democratic change. Its progressive ideals have inspired the pursuit of social justice and human rights guarantees through flourishing NGOs.

While it may be too soon to judge its impact, it is possible to offer some insights about the current wave of liberal Islam. As was already mentioned, an intellectual continuity between the younger supporters of liberal Islam and the older generation of neo-modernists can be observed. The current younger generation has adopted significant tenets, ideas and themes of neo-modernism, such as the theological approach of *ijtihad*; the use of context in making religious interpretation responsive to local and temporal circumstances; the separation between religion and politics; and the importance of civil society, human rights, social justice, religious tolerance and inclusive pluralism. The current young liberal Islam activists, who have emerged in the post-Suharto era, also known as the *reformasi* era, express a strong belief in the idea of democracy in general, including

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freedom of thought and belief and in the democratization process in Indonesia in particular. They also advocate gender equality and building bridges of understanding between religions through a sincere process of interfaith dialogue.

But while the impact of neo-modernism in Indonesia has been impressive, the current wave of liberal Islam is controversial and criticized even within moderate circles of the Muslim mainstream. The JIL, which is the most outspoken organization within current liberal Islamic circles, seems to be the most controversial. The circles of Islam Liberal, particularly JIL, are charged with being too sympathetic to the Western agenda, mistakenly maintaining that everything is open to interpretation, being outside of mainstream Islamic thought, being an “American import,” and taking things too far.<sup>37</sup> It is even suggested that the numerous controversies in which liberal Islam groups have been involved in recent years have led to an anti-liberal backlash in Indonesia and have helped swing opinion within the larger Islamic organizations—including NU and Muhammadiyah—against the Islamic liberal agenda. Many leaders of these organizations, it is argued, now openly oppose liberal ideas, whereas they had previously been tolerant, if not supportive, of them.<sup>38</sup>

The current controversial image of liberal Islamic thought in wider circles has become more evident by the opposition it has met from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). In July 2005 the MUI, which is considered to be the country's highest Islamic authority, issued a *fatwa* (Islamic legal opinion) condemning pluralism, secularism and religious liberalism as contradictory to the teaching of Islam and forbidding the Islamic community of believers (*umat Islam* in Indonesian) to follow these three doctrines (*faham* in Indonesian).<sup>39</sup> While the *fatwa* drew both criticism and support in the Muslim mainstream, it certainly encouraged Muslim hardliners.<sup>40</sup> They soon pushed for the expulsion of JIL from its offices in East Jakarta, arguing that the body was illegal.

Paradoxically, the reformist post-Suharto era poses significant difficulties for liberal Islamic thought. With the removal of restrictions on the

politicization of Islam, those with Islamic political agendas, and even those who espouse a radical worldview, have been allowed a stronger voice. This seems to be an unavoidable “price” that Indonesia must pay for its transition to democracy. Liberal Islamic thought nonetheless remains an integral part of Indonesia’s multifaceted defences against religious zeal and extremism. Though controversial and embraced by only a relatively small number of highly educated Muslims, it continues to deliver a clear, determined message that upholds the values of religious pluralism, democracy, citizenship equality, interfaith dialogue, gender equality, progress and cultural openness. Liberal Islam thereby sharply defies the growing voice of radical Muslims in the post-Suharto era.

The ideals of pluralism and religious tolerance are also nurtured in Indonesian’s widespread national educational system. A significant role has been played by the highly prestigious Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN, State Institutes of Islamic Religion). This Islamic institute for higher education, which has campuses throughout the archipelago, was considerably expanded during Suharto’s era, when it was reformed and changed into a modern institution of Islamic higher education. Its new curriculum has since exposed a great number of students to various Islamic schools of law and theology, other religions, and to modern sciences. Its students have also been encouraged to be creative and to synthesize their classical Islamic studies with modern critical approaches. The idea of using Islamic scholarship to find solutions to modern questions has also been promoted and the importance of *ijtihad* for this purpose has been stressed.<sup>41</sup> The fact that many of the country’s religious teachers, Islamic intellectuals, community leaders and Islamic functionaries are IAIN graduates is likely to strengthen the national ideals of religious tolerance and pluralism. It is not surprising that IAIN’s campuses—particularly IAIN Jakarta, now known as UIN Jakarta, and IAIN Yogyakarta, now known as UIN Yogyakarta—are seen as hotbeds for liberal Islamic thought in recent decades, and that their graduates have played an important role in building Indonesia’s modern civil society.<sup>42</sup>

Though first transmitted from the Middle East, the modernist Islamic legacy of Muhammad ‘Abduh that has deep historical roots in Indonesia seems also to underpin progressive attitudes within the country’s Muslim mainstream. It is alleged that Muhammadiyah, the main Islamic modernist organization in Indonesia and long a platform for ‘Abduh’s ideas, has lost some of its earlier intellectual energy and ideological determination. It is even alleged that it has started to move toward Rashid Rida’s salafism and away from the modernist ideas of ‘Abduh, adopting “neo-salafi” positions that emphasize returning to pristine Islam and strict scripturalism.<sup>43</sup> The original voice of ‘Abduh still seems to persist within Indonesia’s Islamic modernist movement, however, and it is likely that its imprint on Islamic discourse there has made it easier for liberal Islamic thinkers to advance the idea of *ijtihad* and the theological differentiation between the sacred and the profane (both elements of ‘Abduh’s heritage).<sup>44</sup>

Religious pluralism and tolerance also seem to be supported today by an increasing interest in Sufism. The history of the expansion of Islam to Indonesia, as previously mentioned, is strongly connected with the mystical *tarikats*, or Sufi orders. Sufism has always had a strong influence on Islam in the archipelago and, because of its inclusive nature, has contributed over the centuries to religious tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia. It is significant, therefore, that the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia since the late 1970s has included the increasing popularity of Sufism, while the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, which was largely scripturalist in nature, tended to reject Sufi traditions as idolatrous innovations. In Indonesia today the mystical dimension of Islam deeply anchored in Sufism has even expanded beyond its traditional popular and rural space to include educated urban sectors.<sup>45</sup>

Comparing the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East with the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia offers additional insights about the distinctiveness of the Indonesian context. Since the late 1960s the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East and elsewhere has been closely connected with growing pietism, Islamic conservatism, political Islam, fundamentalist

ideology, and Islamic radicalism and militancy. This Islamic resurgence has not left Indonesia's huge Muslim population untouched: there, too, more Muslims have become devout and adopted a strict orthodox way of life. This trend has included an increase in Islamic-oriented activities on university campuses, an intensified study of Islam, growing public interest in Islamic issues, and an upsurge in the construction of mosques. More of Indonesia's *abangan* ("syncretic" Muslims), particularly among the urban middle class, have become pious and been shifted into the category of *santri*, orthodox Muslims.<sup>46</sup> But while the religious resurgence in many parts of the Muslim world has fostered, among other things, assertive political Islam, the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia has been marked by a high degree of tolerance and a general acceptance of the basic ideal of religious pluralism. Since the 1980s the increasing interest in Islam has exposed many Muslims, particularly from the urban middle class, to the ideals of Islamic liberalism and has offered them a progressive understanding of Islam. It has also helped strengthen democratic and pluralistic ideas within the Muslim mainstream.<sup>47</sup>

Indonesian society, with its varied religious, cultural, and ethnic groups, can rightly be considered a *cordon sanitaire* against religious extremism and intolerance. Its Muslim mainstream, as has been emphasized, is loyal to ideals of plurality and tolerance. By definition, the majority of Indonesian Muslims who are *abangan*<sup>48</sup> cannot accept radical Islamic ideas; through radical Islamic eyes, they are liable to be viewed as Muslims in name alone. The militant Islamic movement Darul Islam regarded the huge traditional Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), known for its tolerance and inclusiveness, as "impure and idolatrous." This attitude is said to be currently alive and well within Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).<sup>49</sup> But it is not only the *abangan* who can be seen as a bulwark against Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: the majority of *santri*, the orthodox Muslims, also reject the radical Islamic worldview, let alone its militant manifestations.

It not surprising, therefore, that Laskar Jihad failed to win significant support for its *jihad* against

Christians in the Maluku Islands. Its portrayal of the Christians as dangerous enemies of Islam—as modern embodiments of the Crusaders and emissaries of a hostile religion—gained attention and sympathy only in marginal hardliner circles.<sup>50</sup> Also significant is the interreligious solidarity shown by the NU and Muhammadiyah with the Christians, who constitute 8 to 9 percent of the Indonesian population, during Christmas 2002. Fearing that militant Islamists would again attack churches on Christmas, as they had in 2000, thousands of members of both these Islamic organizations volunteered to help security forces guard churches.

## Indonesia's Political Parties and Polity— Some Thoughts

**A**fter years of authoritarian rule and tight restrictions on Islamic political activity, the *reformasi* period has enabled those with an Islamic agenda—including the vision of Indonesia as an Islamic state abiding by *sharia*—to organize as political parties and participate freely in the democratic process. As to the higher profile that Islamic radicalism has achieved during this period, it seems to be an inevitable by-product of Indonesia's transition to democracy. In the long run, however, the democratic process so missing in many Muslim countries may well provide the key to containing Islamic radicalization. The availability of legitimate channels for political expression and opportunities for political participation may well serve to moderate the views of many who espouse radical Islamic fundamentalism. As for the existing Islamic political parties in Indonesia, they have already become partners in building democracy by accepting its rules and norms. Moreover, the democratic process may even further encourage Islamic political activists to adopt more centrist views.

As previously mentioned, the Islamic political

parties downplayed their Islamic agendas during the parliamentary election campaign of 2004. The case of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) is particularly significant. Formerly named Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Due Party), the party reconstituted itself under its new name in mid-2003 because by winning only about 1.4 percent of the vote in the 1999 parliamentary election it had failed, as the PK, to meet the threshold requirements to contest the 2004 election.<sup>51</sup> The new PKS seems to follow a compromising, accommodative approach. In an attempt to appeal to the urban upper and middle classes, the PKS—which was sometimes described as a fundamentalist party<sup>52</sup>—campaigns in 2004 primarily on issues of moral reform, anti-corruption, clean politics and socioeconomic equality, rather than the idea of introducing *sharia* or promoting an Islamic state.<sup>53</sup>

It seems, moreover, that the PKS has continued to make efforts to position itself at the center of the political map in Indonesia and to expand its constituency. This is done largely by focusing on universal issues. Thus this party, whose predecessor the PK emerged from a *dawah* movement that was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, endeavors to present itself as a party of moral reform.<sup>54</sup> Its 2004 platform does not include the basic doctrinal demand—central to the platform of its predecessor, the PK—that the state impose *sharia* for all Muslims.<sup>55</sup> During the 2004 campaign, notes M. C. Ricklefs, the PKS “shoved *syariah* law well into the background, indeed to the point of invisibility.”<sup>56</sup> Similarly, the party has made efforts to appease those Indonesians who fear the idea of implementing the Islamic law. “We know that people have a sort of phobia about the word *sharia*,” said a party spokesman. He added that “we are promoting Islamic values. These include good governance. We talk about issues such as how we can establish a government which is clean, honest and caring.”<sup>57</sup> The PKS’s constitution and manifesto make no mention, in fact, of establishing an Islamic state.<sup>58</sup>

The PKS has also tried to cultivate a tolerant image. Hidayat Nur Wahid, who now holds the prestigious position of chairman of the super-parliament

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constitutional body called the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People Consultative Assembly), was previously the chairman of the PKS. In that position he stated, “We [the PKS] no longer have any problem coexisting with people of different religions, races or ethnic groups. The Islamic teaching that we promote is one that provides protection for minority groups and freedom to exercise their rights.”<sup>59</sup> Wahid, who is a scholar as well as a politician—having spent ten years at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia earning a B.A., M.A. and Ph.D.—and Tifatul Sembiring, his successor as the head of the PKS, have also started speaking about the Medina Charter as a model for PKS’s agenda.<sup>60</sup> The Medina Charter, which demonstrates respect for religious freedom and equality within an Islamic context, has been proposed for years in liberal Islamic discourse as a relevant model for Indonesia.

The intriguing case of PKS arouses much curiosity among observers of politics in Indonesia. The scholars Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy note that the PKS has shifted away from a heavily Islamic vocabulary, adopted a language of democracy, and tried to appeal also to non-Muslims. But this change, the two scholars argue, does not mean that PKS leaders have abandoned their earlier commitment to Islamic causes. Rather, Bubalo and Fealy say, the leaders argue that it was premature and counterproductive to promote an Islamic agenda among the broader electorate. They explain that most voters have a poor understanding of Brotherhood principles, and their party did not want to risk being labeled sectarian or radical by promoting such an agenda.<sup>61</sup>

The inclusive and moderate attitude presented by the PKS has, therefore, generated quite a bit of skepticism. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a central figure in the liberal Islamic JIL, asserts that the PKS’s projection of itself as inclusive is “camouflage,” adding that their platform shows that “they clearly want Islamic law.”<sup>62</sup> Bubalo and Fealy note that the PKS has “cultivated a public image of itself which is starkly at odds with its internal discourses.” They point out that, “while its spokespeople have stressed the

party's commitment to pluralism and tolerance, PKS training documents and websites indicate a far more militant stream of thinking among many of its branches."<sup>63</sup> Greg Barton argues that "it seems clear that Indonesia's surprising new political force is no less radical in its Islamist convictions than is Malaysia's PAS [Partai Islam se-Malaysia]," but "it recognized that the substance of its longer-term aspirations is not easy to sell and is best kept hidden."<sup>64</sup>

Indeed, one cannot exclude the possibility that the downplaying of the Islamic agenda by the Islamic parties during the 2004 election campaign, and the moderate face presented by the PKS in particular, resulted mainly from an understanding that "political Islam" is not a winning issue in Indonesia. One should not, however, entirely exclude the possibility that the PKS's accommodating approach to the society's multi-religious and multicultural nature may reflect some real ideological change that may, in turn, produce further changes in the future.

About seven years have passed since the beginning of democratization in Indonesia. So far the majority of Indonesia's Muslims have voted for "secular" national parties and "pluralistic Islamic parties" that accept, in principle, the ideology of Pancasila. Indeed, as previously noted, Islamic parties received about 21 percent of the vote in the 2004 parliamentary elections, gaining about 5 percent over their 1999 tally. This relatively modest accomplishment must be attributed largely to the dynamic and ambitious PKS, which received about 7.2 percent of the vote, whereas in 1999, as PK, it won only 1.4 percent. M. C. Ricklefs views the emergence of the PKS as a significant political player as the main development of the 2004 elections, but he argues this does not signal a push towards fundamentalist Islamic politics:

Rather, I interpret it as part of Indonesians' hopes for an end to corruption and for greater competence and morality in government. In many places—above all in Jakarta—the PKS vote was a protest vote against existing parties and leaders. It is that same protest vote and search for new faces that has propelled Mr

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency of Indonesia.<sup>65</sup>

It should be recognized that the PKS has some other achievements as well. Significant among them is the election of Hidayat Nur Wahid, who led the party to its success in the 2004 elections, to the key post of chairman of the MPR, the super-parliament constitutional body. The party has also proved capable of organizing massive street demonstrations and rallies—against U.S. foreign policy, for example—particularly in Jakarta, where it won about a quarter of all the votes in 2004.<sup>66</sup> The PKS has also succeeded in building a strong image of clean, corruption-free politics. Soon after his election as chairman of the MPR, Wahid resigned from his chairmanship of the PKS, saying that, to avoid conflicts of interest, he and other politicians should surrender their party commitments once they took up state duties. "The behavior of the elite must change," he said, "as we can't expect a sweeping reform to come soon. They should concentrate on working for the public."<sup>67</sup> The PKS has an effective party organization and, allegedly, a meritocracy-based cadre network.<sup>68</sup> It is said to be the only genuine cadre party in Indonesia.<sup>69</sup> The PKS also proved itself to be a distinctive player in Indonesian politics by supplying community services—which include emergency relief for victims of floods and fires, medical services, circumcisions and welfare services for the poor.<sup>70</sup>

Many questions remain about the PKS's ideological orientation, its future political path, and more generally about Islam and politics in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the party seems to be already preparing for the 2009 elections and claims to have a long-term plan, called "Vision 2012," to build a network that will reach all city neighborhoods and rural hamlets.<sup>71</sup> Tifatul Sembiring, the current leader of the PKS, said soon after his preliminary appointment as acting chairman of the party that he would try to empower the party to win over more constituents, especially in rural areas. "Critics have said that the urban population makes up most of our constituents," he observed. "We must change this, we have to campaign ourselves down to the village level."<sup>72</sup>

In sum, this ambitious, up-and-coming party remains something of a mystery and will likely continue to garner careful attention from many observers of Indonesia. It appears to have made a strong impression on Indonesian politics. As Bubalo and Fealy state:

PKS represents one of the few genuine alternatives in Indonesian politics to the elite-controlled and vastly corrupt mainstream parties. As such, its emergence is a positive development for Indonesian democracy, offering a new paradigm of political behaviour and greater electoral choice. In this respect, the role that PKS has played is a tangible demonstration of how Islamists can sometimes assist a process of democratisation by generating an alternative to the oligarchic structures that often underpin autocratic—or formerly autocratic—regimes.<sup>73</sup>

## Conclusion

Radical Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia seems to be a relatively marginal phenomenon; so far, the country's distinctive character has managed to keep radicalism on the fringes of society. It seems likely, therefore, that Islamic extremists who defy the current Indonesian polity, particularly those among them who turn to violence and terror, will remain a small minority. Being highly motivated by their fanatic ideology, however, they are likely to continue posing threats and challenges to Indonesia as both a polity and a society.

Indonesia's transition to democracy is a significant landmark, and it challenges the claims that democracy and Islam are incompatible. Yet this process of democratization has raised puzzling questions about the relationships between Islam and politics, and about the future ideological course of the Indonesian polity. While certain Islamic political parties—the PKS being the most noteworthy—have greatly lowered the profile of their Islamic political agenda and rhetoric during the parliamentary elections of 2004, it is likely that many within

their ranks have not abandoned the vision of Indonesia as an Islamic state or the imposition of *sharia* on at least its Muslim population. These parties have indeed accepted the rules of the democratic political game and they are now seen as partners in the building of Indonesian democracy. It is possible that if they take further steps toward moderation and accommodation to the widely accepted national ideals of plurality and religious tolerance, their commitment to the democratic process will get stronger. But it is also possible that, if their political power significantly increases, it could generate an ideological shift in the Indonesian polity toward an Islamic orientation. In the near future, however, it seems much more likely that the distinctive character of Indonesian society will prevent dramatic ideological changes in the Indonesian polity. ■

# Endnotes

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4. See Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle East Dimension* (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), pp. 37-42, 44-56.
5. See Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research*, vol. 10, no. 2 (July 2002): 134.
6. Hasan, "Faith and Politics": 151-54; Sirozi, "The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia": 93-102; Hefner, "Civic Pluralism Denied?," p. 165; Mulyadi, "Violence Under the Banner of Religion": 81-83; International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesia Background: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, Asia Report, no. 83 (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 13 September 2004), p. 12, online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2967&l=1>.
7. See an insight of Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy about the existence of a blurred line, sometimes, in salafism between *salafi* activism and politics: Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?: The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (Alexandria, New South Wales: Lowey Institute for International Policy, 2005), p. 41, online at <http://www.loweyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=229>, p. 41.
8. See Hasan, "Faith and Politics": 154-59; Hefner, "Civic Pluralism Denied?," pp. 165-66; Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*, pp. 38-39; van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia": 134, 144-45. According to the ICG report, *Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, most of the *salafi* movement in Indonesia is not prone to terrorism, in part because it is inwardly focused on faith. Hence, those in Indonesia who fall into the category of "*salafii* jihadism" and are involved in terrorism are not representatives of the movement. Yet this report notes that, under some conditions, a change in the behavior of the *salafi* movement in Indonesia may occur (p. 29).
9. Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 40-41.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
11. On the Ngruki Network, see International Crisis Group (ICG), *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia*, ICG Indonesia Briefing (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 8 August 2002), online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1765&l=1>.
12. Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 41-42.
13. See Christine Dobbin, *Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784-1847*, Scandinavian

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15. See Clive J. Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), pp. 141-43, 146, 248 note 20; Carl A. Trocki, "Political Structures in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in Nicholas Tarling, ed., *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. 2: *The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 104-105; William R. Roff, "South-East Asian Islam in the Nineteenth Century," in P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2: *The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 179-80; C. van Dijk, "Colonial Fears, 1890-1918: Pan-Islamism and the Germano-Indian Plot," in Huub De Jonge and Nico Kaptein, eds., *Transcending Borders: Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam in Southeast Asia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), pp. 59-60.

16. Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 59-61. See also C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); S. Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. XIV, no. 1 (March 1983): 109-33; B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 54-75.

17. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia*; van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia": 128-30, 146.

18. International Crisis Group (ICG), *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, Asia Report no.92 (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 22 February 2005), online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3280&l=1>.

19. On the "pluralistic Islamic parties," see Greg Fealy, "Islamic Politics: A Rising or Declining Force?," in Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman, eds., *Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition* (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001), p. 122..

20. Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 14; Robert W. Hefner, "Modernity and the Challenge of Pluralism: Some Indonesian Lessons," *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 4 (1995): 41; Robert W. Hefner, "Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia," in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatic, eds., *Islam in an Era of Nations-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 29. See also M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Since c. 1200*, 3rd edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 17, 36-58.

21. See Azyumardi Azra, *The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian 'Ulama' in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1992), p. 18; G. W. J. Drewes, "New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?," in Alijah Gordon, ed., *The Propagation of Islam in the Indonesian-Malay Archipelago* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2001), pp. 133-34.

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24. Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 79-80. See also Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 16-20, 94-171.

25. Burhanuddin, "Islamic Sharia: Liberal Muslim Perspective," *Liberal Islam Network*, 3 August 2003, online at <http://islam-lib.com/en/page.php?page=article&id=674>. See also Bill Guerin, "Indonesia: Defending Islam against Itself," *Asia Times Online*, 9 October 2002; "Islam and Democracy in Indonesia," a presentation by Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif, USINDO open forum, 8 April 2002, online at <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Islam%20and%20Democracy%20in%20Indonesia.htm>; Shawn Donnan, "Moderate Indonesia is put to the test," *Financial Times* (London), 14 October 2003.

26. See Mark W. Woodward, "Conversations with Abdurrahman Wahid," in Mark R. Woodward, ed., *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Tempe: Arizona State University, Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), pp. 133-53; Greg Barton, "The Prospects for Islam," in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith, eds., *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 252; International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, ICG Indonesia Briefing (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 10 October 2001),

p. 11, online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1776&l=1>; Christian Kiem, "Re-Islamization among Muslims Youth in Ternate Town, Eastern Indonesia," *Sojourn*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1993): 104.

27. See Greg Barton, "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia," in Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein, eds., *Islam in Asia* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 4-5, 47-49; Marcus Mietzner, "Nationalism and Islamic Politics: Political Islam in the post-Suharto Era," in Arief Budiman, Barbara Haltey and Damien Kingsbury, eds., *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia* (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp. 179-82; ICG, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, p. 11; Robin L. Bush, "Redefining 'Political Islam' in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama and Khittah '26," *Studia Islamika*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2000): 59-86. It is argued that many of the current Islamic radical organizations in Indonesia have their origins among modernist Muslims (ICG, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, p.11; ICG, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia*, pp. 3-4). Greg Barton points out the "Modernist background" of the extremist Muslim voices in Indonesia and notes that "it is rare for traditionalists to adopt a truly radical position" (Barton, "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia," pp. 49-50). Also see Greg Barton, "Islam, Politics, and Regime Change in Wahid's Indonesia," in Julian Weiss, ed., *Tiger's Roar: Asia's Recovery and Its Impact* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 312-17; Dini Djalal, "The Past Catches Up," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, issue 45, vol. 165, 14 November 2002: 18-19.

28. Oddbjørn Leirvik, *Report from a delegation visit to Indonesia by the Oslo Coalition of Freedom of Religion or Belief*, 29 July-11 August 2002, online at [http://www.oslocoalition.org/html/project\\_indonesia/indonesia\\_project\\_report.html](http://www.oslocoalition.org/html/project_indonesia/indonesia_project_report.html).

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